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RECENT DECISIONS

the police themselves who might be mistaken for prowlers and be shot
down by fearful householders."2 5 Such a requirement apparently has
not been a millstone around the neck of federal officers, nor would it
appear to create serious obstacles to law enforcement.
In summary, Ker seems to clarify the basis for the Court's decision
in Miller. It now appears that evidence obtained in violation of the
provisions of section 3109, extended to cover arrests, whether by federal or state officers, will lead to the exclusion of that evidence in a
federal court proceeding. Whether all state officers will be required
to give announcement of authority and purpose before making arrests,
in order to utilize subsequently obtained evidence in a state prosecution, is still unclear. If the majority in the future clearly states that
announcement of authority and purpose is required by the fourth
amendment, the Court will still be evenly divided as to the circumstances
which would justify a non-compliance with the announcement requirement. Justice Harlan, utilizing a completely independent test of 'fundamental fairness,' prevents, for the time being, a clear cut decision of
the Court in this troubled area.
WYLIE A. AITKEN
Bankruptcy: Title of a Trustee to a Bankrupt's Cause of Action
for Personal Injuries-Stephen LeRoy Buda, while a passenger in
an automobile, sustained personal injuries as a result of an accident.
Without commencing an action against his tortfeasor, he filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy three months after the accident. Buda's personal injury claim was settled by his attorney, with the stipulation of
the trustee, for $1,200.00, which, after expenses were paid, left a
balance of $560.00. The referee, interpreting section 70a(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act, held that the bankrupt's cause of action did not vest
in the trustee. The referee's decision was affirmed in the district court
and by the circuit court of appeals." Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act
states:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if any, upon his or their appointment and qualification,
shall in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of the
bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initiating a
proceeding under this Act, except insofar as it is to property
which is held to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of
property wherever located . . . (1) ... (2) . . . (3) . . . (4)
...
(5) property, including rights of action, which prior to the
filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or
which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered:
Provided, That rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander,
25 Miller v. United States, supranote 19, at 313.
1In re Buda, CCH BANKt. L. REP. §60,954 (1963).
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injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative, whether
or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation
shall not vest in the trustee unless by the law of the State such
rights of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process; . . . [Emphasis

added.] 2

The broad issue in the Buda case was whether, in applying the proviso of section 70a, the laws of the state of Wisconsin subject the right
of action for personal injuries to attachment, execution, garnishment,
sequestration, or other judicial process. The narrower issue involved
the interpretation of the word "property" as that word is used in the
Wisconsin creditors' rights statutes. The following Wisconsin statutes
were found by the court to be pertinent to these issues:
1. Chapter 272-Executions
It was determined that only a judgment could be enforced by
execution. Buda had not obtained a judgment, so the trustee could
not be vested with title to the bankrupt's naked cause of action.3
2. Chapter 273-Remedies 5 upplementary to Execution
The trustee contended that interpreting section 273.084 in conjunction with section 990.01(27), 5 defining personal property, a
court could order that the "right of action" for personal injuries
be taken over by the receiver and that the receiver actually proceed
against the tortfeasor. The referee refuted this contention by interpreting the word "property" in section 273.08 as not including a
mere right of action for personal injuries. The referee relied upon
the old Wisconsin case of Gibson v. Gibson6 as authority for the
proposition that a "cause of action" is not a "thing in action" until
the cause of action is reduced to a judgment. 7 In other words, only a
judgment gives rise to a debt which debt is "property."
3. Chapter 128-Creditors'Actions
The trustee contended that he was vested with title to the bank2

BANcRupTcY Acr. §70a, 66 STAT. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §110 (1962).
3 Cf. WIs. STAT. §272.04 (1961).
"Property to be applied to judgment. The court
4 Wis. STAT. §273.08 (1961).
or judge may order any property of the judgment debtor or due to the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, to be applied toward the satisfaction
of the judgment; but if it appear that any person alleged to have property
of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an adverse interest
in the property or denies the debt, such interest or debt shall be recoverable
only in an action against such person by the receiver; and a transfer or other
disposition of such property or interest may be restrained till a sufficient opportunity be given to the receiver to commence the action and prosecute the
same to judgment and execution or until security therefor shall be given as
ordered."
5 Wis. STAT. §990.01(27) (1961). "Personal Property. 'Personal Property' includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidences of debt and energy."
[Emphasis added.]
G43 Wis. 23 (1877).
7 The Gibson case was decided at a time when a cause of action for personal injuries was not assignable or transferable.
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rupt's cause of action under section 128.19(1) (b).• The referee's
disposal of this contention is perhaps the weakest point of the decision. To quote his rejoinder:
Under common law, an action for personal injury or a right
of action therefor could not have been assigned. Gibson v.
Gibson, supra. However, such a right of action is now assignable and is a property right which may pass by operation
of law. McGarvey v. Independent 0 & G Co., 156 Wis. 580.
But I do not believe that it is property which can be levied
upon or sold under judicial process. This statute, Section
128.19, states that the assignee-receiver becomes the owner of
property which might have been levied upon or sold under
process."
It is to be noted that the last sentence quoted seemingly expresses
only a half-truth. Subpart (1) (b) of section 128.19 uses the disjunctive "or," whereas the argument, at least to this writer, appears
to presuppose the conjunctive "and." The opinion then proceeds to
point out that section 128.19(1) (b) is a verbatim copy of the preChandler Act, section 70a (5).
Two cases were cited as interpretive authority for section
70a(5): Ruebush v. Funk' ° and Sibley v. Nason."I Both of these
cases, however, relied upon state law which was interpreted as disallowing a person to transfer or assign his cause of action for personal injuries. These decisions might have gone the other way had
state law at that time allowed assignment of a cause of action for
personal injuries. The circuit court of appeal (7th Cir.) interpreted
section 128.19 by stating:
if the Wisconsin legislature intended "property" subject
to "sequestration" should include a right of action for injuries to one's person it would not obscure that intention by
the general language of paragraph (1) (b) of §128.19 but
would have placed the words "his person or" following the
word "to" in paragraph (1) (c). We conclude on this point
that because the right of action was transferable by assignment it was not ipso facto property which vested under
§128.19....

S Wis. STAT.

§128.19(1)(b)(c) (1961). "Title to Property. The receiver or

assignee upon his qualification shall be vested by operation of law with the
title of the debtor as of the date of filing of the petition or assignment, hereunder, except so far as it is property which is exempt, including (b) property
which prior to the filing of the petition or assignment he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him. (c) Rights of action arising upon contracts or
from the unlawful taking or detention of or injury to his property." [Emphasis added.]
9 In re Buda, Bankruptcy Court, No. 60-B-1110. (Wis. 1961). (Referee's opinion.)
10 63 F. 2d 170 (4th Cir. 1933).
112 196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887 (1907).
1 In re Buda, smpra note 1 ,at 69, 381.
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Needless to say, it is difficult to rebut such a subjective interpretation
of section 128.19.
To contrast the Buda case one can analyze the recent decision of
3
a bankruptcy case applying California law to section
In re Kratoska,1
70a. This case is factually distinguishable from Buda only in that the
bankrupt partially assigned her cause of action to her attorney after
having commenced the action. The district court affirmed the referee's
opinion which passed the title to the bankrupt's pending cause of action
to the trustee under section 70a(5). Section 688.1 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure was applied to the proviso of section 70a(5).
The pertinent portion of section 688.1 states:
Upon motion of a judgment creditor of a plaintiff . .. the...
judge... may in his discretion, order that the judgment creditor
be granted a lien upon the cause of action and upon any judgment subsc', ently procured . . . and . . . may permit said
14
judgment creditor to intervene therein. [Emphasis added.]
The district court reasoned that the procedure under section 688.1 was
similar to the type of remedy afforded by "attachment, execution, garnishment, or sequestration" so as to be included in the catch-all phrase
"or other judicial process." 15 It should be noted that this statute applies
only to actions already commenced, thus making it inapplicable to the
Buda case. The important concept to be gleaned from the California
statute is that it allowed a lien on a cause of action. The attachment of
a lien presupposes "lienable" property. It is at this juncture that California and Wisconsin part, at least under federal interpretation.
Another aside to the Buda case is speculation as to what will occur
when a bankrupt, such as Buda, attempts to have his medical expenses
discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding while at the same time claiming retention of his cause of action against the tortfeasor. Can he recover only for his pain and suffering or can he also recover his special
damages? To quote from the Sibley case: "It is not, and never has
been, the policy of the law to coin into money for the profit of his
creditors the bodily pain, mental anguish, or outraged feelings of a
bankrupt. . . ."16 One can readily sympathize with the reasoning of
Sibley on a public policy basis, but it becomes rather difficult to mold
its message to the framework of the Wisconsin statutes, especially
section 128.19. It would seem that a cause of action for personal injuries more properly belongs to that status of "property exempt from
execution" as embodied in chapter 272.18 of the Wisconsin statutes,
and should be included therein.
PETER S. BALISTRERI
13

In re Kratoska, Bank. Nos. 116,225-MC and 116,226-MC (Cal. Dist. Ct. 1961).

14 CAL. CODE OF CML PROC.
15 Note 2

supra.

§688.1 (1962).

16 Sibley v. Nason, supra note 11, 81 N.E. at 889.

